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THE FEE SIMPLE CONDITIONAL IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
The fee simple conditional estate limits descent to some par-
ticular class of heirs to the exclusion of all others.' This class of
heirs is designated by the terms that form the estate. The nature
of these terms divides the fee simple conditional into two divi-
sions, general and special.2 The general fee simple conditional
is formed by a grant "to A and the heirs of his body" or language
of similar import. In such a case the estate may descend only
to the lineal heirs of A.3 The special fee simple conditional has
two subdivisions. The first includes all estates limited to the
heirs of A by a particular spouse. For example, "to A and the
heirs of his body by his wife, Mary" would create such an estate. 4
The second includes a fee simple conditional in which only the
heirs of a particular sex would meet the requirements such as
"to A and the male (or female) heirs of his body."5 All fee
simple conditional estates can be included in one of these cate-
gories.
The fee simple conditional and the fee simple absolute were
the only two estates of inheritance possible before 1285 by the
common law.0 In that year England adopted the Statute de
Donis which replaced the fee simple conditional estate in land
with the fee tail.7 Since South Carolina has never adopted the
1. Various aspects of the fee simple conditional have been examined in
several sources. Annot., 114 A.L.R. 602 (1938) ; Note, 5 S.C.L.Q. 69 (1952) ;
Note, IX YEAR BOOK OF THE SELDON Soc'y 63 (1947) ; Note, VII YEAR BOOK
OF THE SELDON Soc'y 42 (1943); RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY §§ 59-77 (1936).
2. This division is made by the annotation on the subject in 114 A.L.R. at
602. Most of the examples given in subsequent text and footnotes deal with
the general fee simple conditional for convenience. A special fee simple condi-
tional would be treated in like manner. Some examples of each type follow.
General Fee Simple Conditional: Owings v. Hunt, 53 S.C. 187, 31 S.E. 237
(1898); DuPont v. DuBos, 52 S.C. 244, 11 S.E. 1073 (1898); Hull v. Hull, 2
Strob. Eq. 174 (S.C. 1848); Murrell v. Mathews, 1 Brev. 190 (S.C. 1802).
Special Fee Simple Conditional: Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S.C. 409, 29 S.E.2d
673 (1944); Davis v. Dalrymple, 163 S.C. 490, 161 S.E. 738 (1931); Adams
v. Verner, 102 S.C. 7, 86 S.E. 211 (1915); Lipscomb v. Hammett, 56 S.C. 549,
35 S.E. 194 (1900) ; Graham v. Moore, 13 S.C. 115 (1880).
3. Hay v. Hay, 4 Rich. Eq. 378 (S.C. 1852).
4. Lipscomb v. Hammett, 56 S.C. 549, 35 S.E. 194 (1900).
5. Buist v. Dawes, 4 Strob. Eq. 37 (S.C. 1850).
6. Idle v. Cook, I P. Wins. 70, 24 Eng. Reprint 298 (1705). Willion v.
Berkeley, 1 Plowd. 223, 75 Eng. Rep. 339 (1561).
7. De Donis Conditionalibus, St. Weston II, 13 Edw. I c.l (1285). This
statute replaced the fee simple conditional with the fee tail in all real prop-
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Statute De Donis,8 many of the early common law concepts are
the present law of this jurisdiction. 9
I. CREAToO
A. By Deed
When a deed is granted creating a fee simple conditional, the
limitation is normally "to A and the heirs of his body" or same
like coverage. However, South Carolina courts have been lenient
in allowing variations of this basic wording. 10
One variation which has caused problems of interpretation is
an attempt to make substitutions for the word "heirs." Although
the common law would not allow a substitution of the word "is-
sue" in a deed," in South Carolina it has been recognized that
this term is usually a word of limitation rather than a word of
purchase 1'2 when used in this context. Therefore, a deed "to A and
his issue (or the issue of his body)" may create a fee simple con-
ditional in this state.' 3 However, this is a rule of construction
and not a rule of law. If there is a sufficient showing that a fee
simple conditional was not intended, "issue" is not construed as
a word of limitation. For instance, if there were issue living at
the time the deed was made, intent may be shown that this word
perty. Certain copyholds and annuities were not covered by the statute (See
Annot., 114 A.L.R. 602, 606, 625-27 (1938). However, South Carolina does
not allow personal property to be held by fee simple conditional. Personal prop-
erty granted in this manner passes to the grantor in fee simple absolute. Hay v.
Hay, 4 Rich. Eq. 378 (S.C. 1852).
8. II COOPER, STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 401 (1837).
9. Creswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S.C. 47, 41 S.E.2d 393 (1947);
Crawford v. Masters, 98 S.C. 458, 82 S.E. 973 (1914). Withers v. Jenkins, 14
S.C. 597 (1880); Buist v. Dawes, 4 Rich. Eq. 421 (S.C. 1852); Bedon v.
Bedon, 2 Bail. 231 (S.C. 1831); Mazyck v. Vanderhorst, Bail. Eq. 48 (S.C.
1828); Thomas v. Benton, 4 Desaus. 17 (S.C. 1809); Cruger v. Heyward, 2
Desaus. Eq. 94 (S.C. 1802).
10. Scarborough v. Scarborough 246 S.C. 51, 142 S.E2d 706 (1965);
Bonds v. Hutchison, 199 S.C. 197, 18 S.).2d 661 (1942); Sims v. Clayton,
193 S.C. 98, 7 S.E.2d 724 (1940) ; Antley v. Antley, 132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31
(1925); Branyan v. Tribble, 109 S.C. 58, 95 S.E. 137 (1918); Farmer v.
Corley, 103 S.C. 202, 88 S.E. 23 (1916); Carolinian Timber Co. v. Holden,
90 S.C. 470, 73 S.E. 869 (1912); Clark v. Neves, 76 S.C. 484, 57 S.E. 614
(1907); Holman v. Wesner, 67 S.C. 307, 45 S.E. 206 (1903); Smith v.
Hilliard, 3 Strob. Eq. 211 (S.C. 1849).
11. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 38 (3d ed. 1939).
12. Words of purchase are words which denote who is to take the estate.
Words of limitation mark the duration of an estate. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY
(4th. ed. 1951).
13. Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520, 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949); Sims v. Clayton,
193 S.C. 98, 7 S.E.2d 724 (1940) ; Davis v. Strauss, 173 S.C. 99, 174 S.E. 908
(1934); Sligh v. Sligh, 99 S.C. 307, 83 S.E. 260 (1914); Williams v. Gause,
83 S.C. 265, 65 S.E. 241 (1909).
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was used to describe a class of persons who were to take as ten-
ants in common with the named grantee. 14 The term "bodily
issue" is normally a phrase of limitation, 5 also, but here too
intent may be shown that the grantees were to take only a life
estate. 16
South Carolina requires that a prior estate be granted to A
for his heirs to take a fee simple conditional. If this prior estate
is omitted, the normal words of limitation will act only as words
of purchase.
17
Although the Rule in Wild's Case originally applied only to
cases involving wills, South Carolina has extended the rule to
include deeds. 18 A general statement of the rule usually refers
only to devises: "First, if there is an immediate devise to A and
his children and A has no children, the will is construed as creat-
ing an estate tail in A; second, if A has children, A and his
children take equally as joint tenants for life."'19 Ofcourse, in
South Carolina a fee simple conditional estate results rather than
an estate tail. Following this rule our court has held that where
there is a deed "to A and his children," and there are no children
at the time of the conveyance, "children" is to be construed as
"heirs of the body." Therefore, the grantee would receive a fee
simple conditional estate.20 It would appear that if children
were alive at the time of conveyance they would take as joint
tenants with the named grantee. If this occurred, the interest
they would hold would probably be limited to a life estate. 2'
The Rule in Wild's Case, it must be remembered, is only a rule
of construction.
22
14. Sligh v. Sligh, 99 S.C. 307, 83 S.E. 260 (1914); Guy v. Osbourne, 91
S.C. 291, 74 S.E. 617 (1912); Porter v. Lancaster, 91 S.C. 300, 74 S.E. 374
(1912); Williams v. Gause, 83 S.C. 265, 65 S.E. 241 (1909).
15. Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520, 56 S.E2d 339 (1949); Antley v. Antley,
132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31 (1925).
16. Bonds v. Hutchison, 199 S.C. 197, 18 S.E.2d 661 (1942); Campbell v.
Williams, 171 S.C. 279, 172 S.E. 142 (1932).
17. McCown v. King, 23 S.C. 232 (1885).
18. James v. James, 189 S.C. 414, 1 S.E.2d 494 (1939) ; Dillard v. Yarboro,
77 S.C. 227, 57 S.E. 841 (1907).
19. 2 SiES, FurTUE INTERESTS § 401 (1936).
20. James v. James, 189 S.C. 414, 1 S.E.2d 494 (1939) ; Dillard v. Yarboro,
77 S.C. 227, 57 S.E. 841 (1907).
21. Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S.C. 227, 57 S.E. 841 (1907) ; Izard v. Middleton,
Bail. Eq. 228 (S.C. 1831); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 602, 613-14 (1938).
22. See James v. James, 189 S.C. 414, 1 S.E.2d 494 (1939).
[Vol. 18
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Although the Rule in Shelley's Case2 3 was abolished in this
state by statute in 1924,d 24 it remains important when dealing
with grants made prior to the time the statute took effect.
2 5
When there is a limitation by deed or will "to A for life, re-
mainder to the heirs of his body" the Rule in Shelley's Case
operates in such a way that A gets both a life estate and a re-
mainder so that merger will act and give A a fee simple condi-
tional.26 Variations in the wording have been allowed in South
Carolina2 7 such as the substitution of the word "issue" for
"heirs." When used in this context "issue" has been applied as
a word of limitation and thus passes a fee simple conditional
unless additional language clearly shows that "issue" was to be
used as a word of purchase. An example of such a conveyance
would be a grant "to A for life and then to her issue (or bodily
issue) ."28 Normally a similar deed to "children" does not convey
a fee simple conditional2 9 unless "children" can be shown to
mean "heirs of the body" by additional language in the deed.3 0
B. By Will
The normal language used in the creation of a fee simple con-
ditional by devise is the same as that used in a conveyance by
deed-"to A and the heirs of his body." Similar variations have
23. The Rule in Shelley's Case was named after the famous English case of
Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. Rep. 936, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (KYB. 1579-81), but it
had been an operative rule of law for many years before the decision of this
case. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 82 (3d ed. 1939).
24. Rule in Shelley's Case abolished in certain respects.-The rule of law
known as the rule in Shelley's Case is hereby abolished in the following
particulars, to wit: When, by deed or will or by any instrument in writ-
ing, a remainder in lands, tenements, hereditaments or other real estate
shall be limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of a person to whom
a life estate in the same premises is given, the persons who, on the
termination of the life estate, are the heirs or heirs of the body of such
tenant for life shall take as purchasers in fee simple, by virtue of the
remainder so limited to them. The provisions of this section shall not
affect wills, deeds and other instruments in writing executed prior to
October 1, 1924 or the construction of such wills, deeds and other
instruments in writing.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-2 (1962).
25. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959) ; Blume v. Pearcy,
204 S.C. 409, 29 S.E.2d 673 (1944).
26. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959).
27. Sims v. Clayton, 193 S.C. 98, 7 S.E.2d 724 (1940); Clark v. Neves,
76 S.C. 484, 57 S.E. 614 (1907).
28. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959); Smith v. Hanna,
215 S.C. 520, 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949); Green v. Green, 210 S.C. 391, 42 S.E.2d
884 (1947); Sligh v. Sligh, 99 S.C. 307, 83 S.E. 260 (1914).
29. Clark v. Neves, 76 S.C. 484, 57 S.E. 614 (1907).
30. Branyan v. Tribble, 109 S.C. 58, 95 S.E. 137 (1918); Clark v. Neves,
76 S.C. 484, 57 S.E. 614 (1907).
1966]
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been allowed in this area, also.3 ' If this wording shows a clear
intent to create a fee simple conditional, additional clauses of
unclear meaning will not affect the devise.3 2 But if there is a
clear intent shown that this estate was not desired, the entire
will may be considered to determine the actual intent of the
testator.33
In this area, as in most others concerning this estate, a prob-
lem arises when there is an attempt to substitute another term
for "heirs" even though this word has never been required in
wills for the creation of an estate of inheritance.8 4 South Caro-
lina courts have recognized that a devise "to A and his issue"
creates a fee simple conditional.3 3 However, before "children"
may be substituted for "heirs" to create this estate, the intention
for such a result must be found.36
The Rule in Wild's Case has always been important in the
interpretation of wills. The rule applies to a devise "to A and
his children" in the same manner as it applies in a deed which
was discussed earlier. However, under a will two situations are
possible. If A has no children alive at the time of the testator's
death, the critical date, the devisee receives a fee simple con-
ditional.37 If A does have living children on the critical date,
he and the children would take as tenants in common. They
31. Lucas v. Shumpert, 192 S.C. 208, 6 S.E.2d 17 (1939) ; Cureton v. Little,
119 S.C. 31, 111 S.E. 803 (1922) ; Boyles v. Wagner, 91 S.C. 183, 74 S.E. 380
(1912) ; Bethea v. Bethea, 48 S.C. 440, 26 S.E. 716 (1897) ; Selman v. Robert-
son, 46 S.C. 262, 24 S.E. 187 (1896) ; Renwick v. Smith, 11 S.C. 294 (1879) ;
Dehay v. Porcher, 1 Rich. Eq. 266 (S.C. 1845); Laborde v. Penn, McM. Eq.
448 (S.C. 1842) ; Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Eq. 244 (S.C. 1835); Jones v. Postell,
Harp. 92 (S.C. 1824).
32. Lucas v. Shumpert, 192 S.C. 208, 6 S.E2d 17 (1939) ; Adams v. Verner,
102 S.C. 7, 86 S.E. 211 (1915).
33. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E2d 4 (1959); McWhite v.
Roseman, 114 S.C. 177, 103 S.E. 586 (1920); Adams v. Verner, 102 S.C. 7,
86 S.E. 211 (1915).
34. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 31 (3d ed. 1939).
35. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959); Lucas v.
Shumpert, 192 S.C. 208, 6 S.E.2d 17 (1939); Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S.C. 303,
194 S.E. 817 (1938); Federal Land Bank v. Wells, 172 S.C. 1, 172 S.E. 707
(1934) ; Baxter v. Early, 131 S.C. 374, 127 S.E. 607 (1925) ; Strother v. Folk,
123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922) ; Adams v. Verner, 102 S.C. 7, 86 S.E. 211
(1915).
36. Simpson v. Antley, 137 S.C. 380, 135 S.E. 469 (1926); Strother v. Folk,
123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922); Smith v. Hilliard, 3 Strob. Eq. 211 (S.C.
1849).
37. Simpson v. Antley, 137 S.C. 380, 135 S.E. 469 (1926); Dillard v. Yar-
boro, 77 S.C. 227, 57 S.E. 841 (1907) ; Renwick v. Smith, 11 S.C. 294 (1879).
[Vol. 18
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would get a fee simple absolute by statute.38 As has been stated,
this is a rule of construction only.
3 9
The Rule in Shelley's Case operates upon a devise in like
manner as upon a conveyance. A devise "to A for life, and at his
death to the heirs of his body" will pass a fee simple conditional,
also.40 "Issue," "issue of his body," or "bodily issue" may be sub-
stituted in the devise with the same result.4 ' However, the word
"children" cannot be used to pass the fee simple conditional un-
less the intent that it means "heirs of the body" can be shown.
42
Since the Rule in Shelley's Case is a rule of law and overrides
any intent of the testator, where a fee simple conditional is
created under this rule, additional words of unclear meaning
will not affect the devise.48
0. By Implication
A majority of the South Carolina cases have denied any pos-
sibility of the creation of a fee simple conditional by implica-
tion. 44 However, there are some cases which seem to indicate that




A. Descent and Reverter
When the holder of a fee simple conditional dies leaving heirs
who meet the requirements of the estate, his interest vests in
them immediately. This interest passes to his heirs per formam
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-232 (1962).
39. See James v. James, 189 S.C. 414, 1 S.E2d 494 (1939).
40. Strother v. Folk, 123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922).
41. Green v. Green, 210 S.C. 391, 42 S.E.2d 884 (1947); Strother v. Folk,
123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922) ; Farmer v. Corley, 103 S.C. 202, 88 S.E. 23
(1916) ; Boyles v. Wagner, 91 S.C. 183, 74 S.E. 380 (1912) ; Simms v. Buist,
52 S.C. 554, 30 S.E. 400 (1898).
42. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959); Strother v.
Folk, 123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922).
43. Green v. Green, 210 S.C. 391, 42 S.E2d 884 (1947) ; Lucas v. Shumpert,
192 S.C. 208, 6 S.E.2d 17 (1939) ; Cureton v. Little, 119 S.C. 31, 111 S.E. 803
(1922); Anot., 114 A.L.R. 602, 624 (1938).
44. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Monk, 165 S.C. 111, 162 S.E. 911
(1932) ; Bomar v. Corn, 150 S.C. 111, 147 S.E. 659 (1929); Barber v. Craw.
ford, 85 S.C. 54, 67 S.E. 7 (1910); Harkey v. Neville, 70 S.C. 125, 49 S.E
218 (1904) ; Buist v. Dawes, 4 Rich. Eq. 421 (S.C. 1852); Bedon v. Bedon,
2 Bail. Eq. 231 (S.C. 1831).
45. Harkey v. Neville, 70 S.C. 125, 49 S.E. 218 (1904) ; Addison v. Addison,
9 Rich. Eq. 58 (S.C. 1856); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 602, 625 n. 173 (1938).
1966] NOTES
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doni and not by the Statute of Descent and Distribution.46
The holder cannot dispose of land held in fee simple conditional
by devise.
47
When a fee simple conditional is created the grantor retains
a possibility of reverter in himself and his heirs. Anytime that
the requirements of the estate cannot be fulfilled on the death
of a holder (the holder has no heirs to fit the description of the
grant), the property reverts to the grantor.48 In a case where
the grantor is not living at the termination of the fee simple
conditional, the land involved passes directly to his heirs as
determined at the date of termination. This possibility of re-
verter is not an estate and cannot be devised or inherited in the
usual sense. Since it does not pass through the grantor's estate
his creditors cannot reach the property after his death.49
No South Carolina case has ever directly decided what limi-
tations are placed upon the heirs who take the land at the death
of the grantee in fee simple conditional. Some cases have stated
that these heirs receive a fee simple conditional per formam
doni.jY Logically this would seem to place all the limitations of
the original estate upon these heirs, i.e., they would not be able
to devise the land or to effectively convey it without birth of
the required issue. However, there is authority for the view that
although these takers could not devise the land, they should be
46. Bonds v. Hutchison, 199 S.C. 197, 18 S.E.2d 661 (1942); Lucas v.
Shumpert, 192 S.C. 208, 6 S.E.2d 17 (1939); Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S.C. 303,
194 S.E. 817 (1938); Wilson v. Poston, 129 S.C. 345, 123 S.E. 849 (1924);
Davis v. Hodge, 102 S.C. 178, 86 S.E. 478 (1915); Vaughan v. Langford, 81
S.C. 282, 62 S.E. 316 (1908) ; Mattison v. Mattison, 65 S.C. 345, 43 S.E. 874
(1903) ; Owings v. Hunt, 53 S.C. 187, 31 S.E. 237 (1898) ; Burnett v. Burnett,
17 S.C. 545 (1882) ; Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. 441 (S.C. 1853) ; Adams
v. Chaplin, 1 Hill's Eq. 265 (S.C. 1833).
47. Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S.C. 303, 194 S.E. 817 (1938) ; Antley v. Antley,
132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31 (1925) ; Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S.C. 282, 62 S.E.
316 (1908); Owings v. Hunt, 53 S.C. 187, 31 S.E. 237 (1898); Blount v.
Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1889) ; Burnett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545 (1882) ;
Pearse v. Killian, McM. Eq. 231 (S.C. 1841); Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Eq. 244
(S.C. 1835); Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265 (S.C. 1833).
48. Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E2d 913 (1959); Burnett v.
Snoddy, 199 S.C. 399, 19 S.E.2d 904 (1942); Pearse v. Killian, McM. Eq. 231
(S.C. 1841).
49. Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959); Burnett v.
Snoddy, 199 S.C. 399, 19 S.E.2d 904 (1942); Corley v. Hoyt, 116 S.C. 110,
107 S.E. 34 (1921); Laborde v. Penn, McM. Eq. 448 (S.C. 1842); Pearce v.
Killian, McM. Eq. 231 (S.C. 1841); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 76 (1936).
50. Scarborough v. Scarborough, 246 S.C. 51, 142 S.E.2d 706 (1965) ; Bur-
nett v. Burnett, 17 S.C. 545, 550 (1882) ; Withers v. Jenkins, 14 S.C. 597, 610,
614 (1880); Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. 441, 445 (S.C. 1853); Hay v.
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allowed to effectively convey it in fee simple absoluteul without
the requirement of birth of issue.
5 2
B. Conveyances
South Carolina law clearly allows the holder of a fee simple
conditional to convey the land in fee simple absolute after he
has met the requirement of birth of issue. Such an inter vivos
conveyance cuts off the possibility of reverter completely and
divests the designated issue of any possibility of inheritance.53
The same result will be reached even though there are no living
issue at the time of the conveyance if such issue were alive at
the time the fee simple conditional was granted or have been
born alive since the grant and have died prior to this con-
veyance.
54
A conveyance prior to the birth of issue will always be suf-
ficient to destroy all claims of later born heirs who satisfy the
provisions of the estate.55 However, the lives of these issue deter-
mine what estate can be sold. If the issue are never born and the
condition is not fulfilled, the possibility of reverter will activate
and return the property to the grantor or his heirs at the time
of the death of the holder in fee simple conditional.56 When
there is a conveyance prior to the birth of the required issue and
such issue is subsequently born, two possibilities may occur. If
51. CHALLis, REAL PROPERTY 266 (Sweet's ed.); 1 Cruise, Digest 28, tit.2
c.1, §7 (1st Am. ed. 1808) ; Co. Litt. 19a; 2 Blackstone 100 semble (10th ed.
1787). See Nevil's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 33a, 77 Eng. Rep. 460, 464 (1604).
52. Means, 1964-65 Survey, S.C. Property, 18 S.C.L. REv. 106, 112 (1966).
53. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959); Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 187 S.C. 86, 196 S.E. 541 (1938); Davis v. Dalrymple, 163 S.C. 490,
161 S.E. 738 (1931); Antley v. Antley, 132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31 (1925);
McWhite v. Roseman, 114 S.C. 177, 103 S.E. 586 (1920); Branyan v. Tribble,
109 S.C. 58, 95 S.E. 137 (1918); Adams v. Verner, 102 S.C. 7, 86 S.E. 211
(1915) ; Lane v. Dillon, 101 S.C. 196, 85 S.E. 369 (1915) ; Surles v. McLaurin,
94 S.C. 308, 77 S.E. 944 (1913); Holley v. Still, 91 S.C. 487, 74 S.E. 1065
(1912) ; Carolinan Timber Co. v. Holden, 90 S.C. 470, 73 S.E. 869 (1912);
Mattison v. Mattison, 65 S.C. 345, 43 S.E. 874 (1903); Owings v. Hunt, 53
S.C. 187, 31 S.E. 237 (1898); Powers v. Bullwinkle, 33 S.C. 293, 11 S.E.
971 (1890) ; Graham v. Moore, 13 S.C. 115 (1880) ; Dehay v. Porcher, 1 Rich.
Eq. 266 (S.C. 1845); Bailey v. Seabrook, Rich. Eq. Cas. 419 (S.C. 1829).
54. Graham v. Moore, 13 S.C. 115 (1880); Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq.
271 (S.C. 1851); 2 PowE=., REAL PROPERTY § 195 (1962).
55. Powers v. Bullwinkle, 33 S.C. 293, 11 S.E. 971 (1890); Barksdale v.
Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C. 1851); Izard v. Middleton, Bail. Eq. 228 (S.C.
1831).
56. Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C. 1851); RESTATzEMENT,
PROPERTY § 70 (1936).
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the issue survives the parent the conveyance bars the claims of
the heirs and the interest of the possibility of reverter.
5 7 How-
ever, if the issue predeceases the holder of the fee simple condi-
tional, the conveyance appears to be effective only for the life-
time of the tenant. At his death the possibility of reverter would
return the land to the grantor or his heirs. The person taking
the property by such a conveyance prior to birth of issue would
receive only a life estate per autre vie (for the life of the holder
in fee simple conditional).""
0. Release, Surrender, and Merger
The grantor or his heirs may release the possibility of reverter
to the holder of the fee simple conditional. When such a formal
release occurs, the tenant at that time receives a fee simple
absolute. 9
The opposite of release, surrender, has been denied the holder
of a fee simple conditional by some authorities. In other words,
a person who holds land in fee simple conditional cannot give
the land to the grantor or his heirs by a formal surrender. This is
so because in a surrender a smaller estate must be absorbed by
a larger estate, and the possibility of reverter is not an estate
but is a mere right based on a condition.°0 However, as has been
noted before, the same result may be obtained after birth of issue
to the holder by a conveyance to the grantor or his heirs.61
Even where the possibility of reverter and the title in fee
simple conditional have come together in the same person, the
South Carolina courts have not allowed merger of these
interests. 2
D. Enoumbrances
Land held in fee simple conditional is subject to liability for
debts incurred by the owner during his lifetime. This liability
survives even the death of the owner and the passage of the land
57. Croxall v. Sherrerd 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 572 (1867).
58. Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S.C. 227, 57 S.E. 841 (1907); Barksdale v.
Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C. 1851) ; Izard v. Middleton, Bail. Eq. 228 (S.C.
1831) ; Kepler v. Larson, 131 Iowa 438, 108 N.W. 1033 (1906).
59. Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S.C. 282, 62 S.E. 316 (1908) ; Dillard v. Yar-
boro 77 S.C. 227, 57 S.E. 841 (1907) ; Pearse v. Killian, McM. Eq. 231 (S.C.
18415; Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265 (S.C. 1833).
60. Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265 (S.C. 1833); Note, VII YEAR Boox
OF THE SELDON Soc'y 42 (1943).
61. Cases cited note 53 mupra.
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to his designated heirs whether or not a judgment has been
obtained.
03
In South Carolina the widow of a holder in fee simple condi-
tional who has satisfied the requirement of birth of issue is en-
titled to dower in land so held regardless of whether the issue
survived the decedent. This means that the right to dower exists
even though the land has passed to the designated heirs of the
deceased or reverted to the grantor or his heirs.0 4 This does not
apply to land that was conveyed to the husband and his issue by
a former wife who does not become the widow. For example,
H and W are married. W grants land to H and the heirs of his
body and then dies. H later marries B. When H dies leaving B
as his widow, she does not have a right to dower in the land H
received from W.65 It appears that in a normal situation the
dower interest will activate even though no issue has been born
to the holder before his death. 6
If two or more persons hold land in fee simple conditional as
tenants in common, South Carolina allows them to obtain parti-
tion of this land. 7 The effect of such a partition upon the later
death of one partitioner without issue is an open question at
this time. For instance, if G granted land to his two daughters,
M and L, in fee simple conditional and after G's death M and L
partitioned the land, what happens to the land held by L on her
death without issue? This situation closely resembles the facts
of a South Carolina case, Barksdale v. Gamage,8 where the
lower court held that upon L's death her share would revert to
the original grantee (G) or his heirs. This case was reversed by
the appellate court on other grounds, but the specific problem
involved here was not discussed. The lower court decision seems
to be supported by one authority in the general area of parti-
62. Adams v. Chaplin, 1 Hill Eq. 265 (S.C. 1833).
63. Bonds v. Hutchison, 199 S.C. 197, 18 S.E.2d 661 (1942); Burnett v.
Burnett, 17 S.C. 545 (1882) ; Izard v. Middleton, Bail Eq. 228 (S.C. 1831);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 75 (1936).
64. Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. 441 (S.C. 1853); Milledge v. Lamar, 4
Desas. Eq. 617 (S.C. 1816) (dictum) ; See Means, Estate Planning and the Law
of Wills and Inheritance for South Carolina Farmers, 12 S.C.L.Q. 491, 513-14
(1960).
65. See Means, supra note 64, at 514 n. 148 (1960).
66. Milledge v. Lamar, 4 Desaus. Eq. 617 (S.C. 1816) seems to indicate this
result by dictum.
67. Holley v. Still, 91 S.C. 487, 74 S.E. 1065 (1912); DuPont v. DuBos, 52
S.C. 244, 11 S.E. 1073 (1898); Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C.
1851); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 72 (1936).
68. Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq. 271 (S.C. 1851).
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tion.00 Such a result would seem to defeat the provisions of the
estate itself which provide for a reversion only if there are no
designated issue alive.70 Here M, the other partitioner, was alive
and met the requirements of the original grant. If the problem
arose today the court would probably rule that the partition cut
off all the rights of the other parties to the land taken by one
of their number under the partition.71 Therefore upon failure
of the designated heirs of one partitioner the land held by him
would revert to the original grantor even though other parti-
tioners or their issue were alive.
III. LImITATIONS AYE A FEE SIMPiE CONDITIONAL
Before the passage of the Statute De Donis the common law
of England permitted remainders after fee simple conditional
estates. 72 There is some support in early South Carolina cases
for this position,7" but the overwhelming weight of the case law
in this state does not allow a remainder after a fee simple con-
ditional.
7 4
In some situations a limitation over may be created by an
executory interest such as "to A and the heirs of his body, but
if he should die without such heirs, over to B" (or words of
similar import). When such a limitation is found in a devise it
is considered valid, and if A dies without birth of the designated
issue, the limitation over operates rather than the possibility of
reverter.7 r Before 1925 when such a limitation over was at-
69. 2 CASNER, AMEmRcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.20 (1952).
70. Cases cited note 48 mupra.
71. See generally 2 CAsNER, AmEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.19-.26 (1952).
72. See Note, 5 S.C.L.Q. 69, 70 (1952).
73. McCorkle v. Black, 7 Rich. Eq. 407 (S.C. 1855); Cruger v. Heyward,
2 Desaus. 94 (S.C. 1802).
74. Selman v. Robertson, 46 S.C. 262, 24 S.E. 187 (1896); Allen v. Fogler,
6 Rich. 54 (S.C. 1852) ; Buist v. Dawes, 4 Strob. Eq. 49 (S.C. 1850) ; Whit-
worth v. Stuckey, 1 Rich. Eq. 404 (S.C. 1845); Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Eq.
244 (S.C. 1835); Bedon v. Bedon, 2 Bail. 231 (S.C. 1831); Bailey v. Seabrook,
Rich. Eq. Cas. 419 (S.C. 1829); Mazyck v. Vanderhorst, Bail. Eq. 48 (S.C.
1828).
75. Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S.C. 303, 194 S.E. 817 (1938) ; Federal Land Bank
v. Wells, 172 S.C. 1, 172 S.E. 707 (1934); Baxter v. Early, 131 S.C. 374, 127
S.E. 607 (1925) ; Strother v. Folk, 123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922); Corley
v. Hoyt, 116 S.C. 110, 107 S.E. 34 (1921); Allen v. Brownlee, 110 S.C. 531,
96 S.E. 615 (1918); Surles v. McLaurin, 94 S.C. 308, 77 S.E. 944 (1913);
Bethea v. Bethea, 48 S.C. 440, 26 S.E. 716 (1897); Selman v. Robertson, 46
S.C. 262, 24 S.E. 187 (1896); Powers v. Bullwinkle, 33 S.C. 293, 11 S.E.
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tempted by deed, it was not allowed.7 6 However, there seems to
be some authority which would support such a limitation over
in certain circumstances. 7
IV. CocLsIoN
The fee simple conditional is one of the most involved areas
of property law in this state. It has been of slight importance in
all other jurisdictions for many years. However, attempts to abol-
ish the estate have been unsuccessful, and unless there is a drastic
change in the legislative or judicial mind, the fee simple con-
ditional will continue to play its confusing role in the property
law of South Carolina.
WIEAX S. DAViis
76. Edwards v. Edwards, 2 Strob. Eq. 101 (S.C. 1848); see Note, 5
S.C.L.Q. 69, 71-72 (1952).
77. Smith v. Clinkscales, 102 S.C. 227, 85 S.E. 1064 (1915); see Note, 5
S.C.L.Q. 69, 72 (1952).
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